

Charles

4/23/04 Interview with major [↑] CHAMBERS

- Col. Susan Kuehl - J-C
- Major Meyer - Counsel's office
- M. Kara

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-042, document no. 18
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014

- Air Force - Space and missiles Operations.
- missile Warning at HQ and in the field
- ICBM - Satellite missile Warnings.
- Surveillance Officer - Team J-2
- Primary interface b/w NMCC and ~~the~~ NORAD
- Came TO NMCC in June 2001.

Day of 9-11

- Shift Start - 5:00 A.M.

- NORAD in middle of Global Guardian exercise
- He was seated in corner of EA cell.
 - ↓
- job → Monitor Software Program covering missile data that ~~the~~ NORAD is tracking.
- Ch EA Cell on Team 2.
 - ↓
- Normally 4 people on his side of room.
 - ↓
- on 9/11 → 5 people in room.
 - ↓
- ✱ only 1 Staff Sgt - Valencia
Harrison.
 - ↓
- LT. Col. Brundemen - Senior EA officer.
- Major Newell → helping out as floater on EA Team.

- First clue of Problem on 9/11 → EA has ~~large~~ T.V. screen
Socc operators have small T.V. screens
- He saw large T.V. screen in E.A.
- Fox news reported a plane had hit Tower (WTC)
- He had no prior phone call from a Govt. office to advise him of WTC-1 crash.
- A phone ~~call~~ call to NACC would come in through the SOCC of the Junior EA officer.
- Fox news said WTC 1 Crash was ~~a~~ from a Commuter A/C.
- Chambers believed it was an accident. → He was not thinking it was a large Commercial A/C.
- He saw WTC-2 Crash. Live on T.V.

— # Critical Confusion → Was it
a replay of First WTC Crash
or a Second WTC Crash?

— He was not in communication
with any other Govt. Agency between
WTC 1 Crash and WTC-2 Crash.

— If a call came in to DDO →
~~they~~ (e.g. from FAA) → they
would have advised EA Cell
by using the Intercom ("Bomb
Box").

* — No Intercom Announcement
that FAA or NORAD was on
a phone line with NMCC.

— After WTC-2 Crash → he
concluded this was NO Accident.

— He told Lt. Col. Bundesman
and Staff Sgt. Harrison "We
are going to have to bring up
a Significant Events Conference"

↓
He had to tell DDO first and

DDO had to approve SIEC.

* - When he reached DDO office →
NORAD was already on phone
line w/ SOCC-NMCC asking for NMCC
to establish SIEC.

- @ 1300 Z (9:00 AM) - NMCC
Calls FAA. FAA provides
brief to NMCC: ~~Explosion~~ Explosion
at WTC 1 from A/C crash and
report A/C if poss. byock.

↓
- Chambers says someone from
DDO - (probably ADDO
Gardner) would have made this
call to FAA.

* - He would not know if FAA
was on NO I WOT call.

- SOCC operators → system has a
display screen w/ names and
phone #'s of all agencies that
are being called into the Conference.
↓ Color codes → Change to signify
if phone ringing or if phone has been answered.

- System does not indicate by Color Code or otherwise if party receiving call is listening.

- SIEC (FAA was not on the Conference).

- FAA is not part of ~~that~~ SIEC list of agencies.

(A) "X" denotes parties automatically included in SIEC.

AA
not
list

(B) List of other agencies that can be brought into SIEC at the direction of senior officer.

- on 9/11/01 → He does not believe they had a Direct Hotline to FAA.


- 9/11/01 → He thinks NMCC would have used STU-III to Call FAA.

- Communications Watch office may know Phone # TO FAA That NMCC Called on the STU III.

↓
- FAA STU III must be secure on

FAA will not be allowed into the Telecon.

— They tried multiple X to get FAA on SSEC ~~to~~ to no avail b/c the systems were not compatible on a security level basis.

— Sgt. Harrison → - ~~Corr~~ 

↓
SOCC operator - Only one on duty on 9-11 → Tried to get FAA on the line but could not get them.

— Chambers says we got "a Call from FAA" over our Unclassified Phone line.

↓
— He monitored it at times and the junior (EA) person monitored it at times. (all)

— They ~~could~~ could not link that line into anything else.

— Either nothing was being said over

line or nothing of substance
is coming over that line.

Junior EA person ^{→ Army major Sgt - Fletcher} and he was
trying to juggle job of listening
to FAA Conference and

They were getting information
that NORAD was in contact
with FAA over a secure line.

had been
on team
1 month
she
was
not
after
9-11

* All they were hearing was "echoes"
of what they were hearing on
the SIEC or the ATCC.

— It was a call in from FAA →
intermittent ~~and~~ Comms and a
lot of dead air.

— "Air Hyack Conference" ^{→ connection} → NMCC
would have initiated it ~~on~~ their line.
↳ the NMCC did not ~~activate~~
activate this on 9-11.

— FAA - Hyack Coordinator may
have contacted NMCC on the Vaseline Inc.

- * ~~C~~CMOC gave ~~update~~ updates that they say they received from FAA.
- FAA line was not constantly monitored b/c^e ① limited # of personnel / a lot of tasks to do.
② FAA line not viewed as one of utmost importance not viewed as urgent.
- He wanted to identify status of NCA figures (POTUS, VPOTUS, CTCs).
- He and junior EA person → only 2 people who would have listened to the line.
- He may have spent 25% of his time listening to FAA call.
- She spent same time listening to the call.
- To the extent they heard something, it was not "source" information.
- You could not listen to FAA line on a speaker. → you had to have a phone in your hand.

↳ It was a push to talk hand-set.

↳ He says they were not hearing fresh stuff.